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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
I Always Feel Like Somebody’s Sensing Me!
A Framework to Detect, Identify, and Localize Clandestine Wireless Sensors
by
Akash Deep Singh
Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020
Professor Mani B. Srivastava, Chair
The increasing ubiquity of low-cost wireless sensors in smart homes and buildings has enabled
users to easily deploy systems to remotely monitor and control their environments. However,
this raises privacy concerns for third-party occupants, such as a hotel room guest who may
be unaware of deployed clandestine sensors. Previous methods focused on specific modalities
such as detecting cameras, but do not provide a generalizable and comprehensive method
to capture arbitrary sensors which may be “spying” on a user. In this work, we seek to
determine whether one can walk in a room and detect any wireless sensor monitoring an
individual. As such, we propose SnoopDog , a framework to not only detect wireless sensors
that are actively monitoring a user, but also classify and localize each device. SnoopDog
works by establishing causality between patterns in observable wireless traffic and a trusted
sensor in the same space, e.g., an inertial measurement unit (IMU) that captures a user’s
movement. Once causality is established, SnoopDog performs packet inspection to inform
the user about the monitoring device. Finally, SnoopDog localizes the clandestine device in
a 2D plane using a novel trial-based localization technique. We evaluated SnoopDog across
several devices and various modalities, and were able to detect causality 96.6% percent of
the time, classify suspicious devices with 100% accuracy, and localize devices to a sufficiently
reduced sub-space.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The explosion of internet-of-things devices in smart homes, buildings, and cities [37] can be
partly attributed to the proliferation of low-cost wireless sensors in tandem with advance-
ments in embedded device battery technology [12]. Affordable sensors, including cameras
and motion sensors, have facilitated deployments to monitor and control these environments.
Although there are profound positive impacts that ubiquitous sensor-rich environments can
have on society, there is an inherent risk in enabling users access to such pervasive sensing
– particularly when these environments host occupants oblivious to the presence of these
sensors.
A person’s physical privacy in these contexts is entirely at the discretion of the owner
who deploys these sensors. Regulation is unclear in more informal settings, such as a guest
residing in a home or a homestay lodging. Although these environments may be enhanced
with a legitimate set of sensors and actuators to provide security, surveillance, comfort,
and convenience, there have been several instances where a hosting owner has attempted to
spy on the occupants in homestay settings [7], motel lodgings [15], and rooms aboard cruise
ships [36]. There are even instances in well-established hotel chains and mall restrooms when
a malicious employee or customer has bugged several rooms [31]. In [35], Southworthreport
that such sensors are also used for ‘intimate partner stalking’, which may enable domestic
abusers.
The prevalent method to detect bugs involves an RF receiver that senses if the received
power in a particular frequency range is above a certain threshold. However, since bug de-
tectors work on the principle of sensing surrounding RF signals, they can easily be falsely
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triggered by legitimate RF devices such as mobile phones, radios, and other devices such as
smart TV and smart doorbell in the vicinity. This lack of reliability limits the practicality of
these detectors. Furthermore, they provide no semantic information regarding device infor-
mation, location, or whether the device is actually monitoring a user. An alternate method
has emerged to detect the presence of IoT devices based on network traffic statistics [14];
however, such an approach still fails to capture information about device location or active
monitoring region.
More sophisticated solutions have recently been proposed to specifically detect wireless
cameras. The general approach is to correlate known semantic information about the en-
vironment with network traffic patterns. For instance, Wampler [43] showed that changing
lighting conditions causes notable variations to appear in a wireless camera’s video traffic;
that is, video encoding leaks sensitive environmental information. This discourse was lever-
aged to detect a camera by flickering a light source for a short period of time and correlating
it to changes in network traffic [23,28]. Similarly, an approach has been presented that cor-
relates the traffic patterns of a trusted camera with traffic patterns of other hidden cameras
on a network to detect whether they are simultaneously observing the same space [47]. But
each of these camera-specific approaches, which correlate simultaneous observations between
trusted cameras and hidden cameras, fail to generalize across modalities. For example, vary-
ing lighting conditions would be ineffective for detecting a hidden microphone or an RF
sensor. More interestingly, there has been a preliminary effort that used human motion
as to detect and coarsely localize hidden cameras [4]. Human motion is an example of an
event that can be generalized across many modalities if the event is formalized correctly.
Furthermore, human activity serves as the ideal reference event for determining whether a
clandestine sensor is monitoring a human.
In this paper, we propose , a generalized framework to detect clandestine wireless sensors
that are monitoring a user in a private space. SnoopDog leverages the notion of causality
to determine if the values of a trusted sensor cause patterns in traffic stemming from other
devices. In particular, SnoopDog works by having the user perturb the trusted sensor val-
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ues to observe if there is a causal pattern in the traffic for a different device. For instance, if
a wireless camera is monitoring a user who is wearing an inertial measurement unit (IMU),
the IMU values indicate a causal relationship with the camera’s traffic. SnoopDog utilizes
encoding scheme models of different wireless sensing modalities to classify the sensor type,
and then cross-references packet inspection with publicly available information of manufac-
turers to identify the specific device model. We further introduce a novel approach that
leverages sensor coverage techniques to provide fine-grained localization of a detected sen-
sor. We implemented SnoopDog utilizing a trusted set of sensors on a user’s mobile phone
as well as a packet sniffer to observe traffic patterns. In the future, we envision SnoopDog
to be implemented as an app on either a smartwatch or a smartphone, both of which have
sufficient sensing capabilities (with improvements in their cards that would allow them to
hop channels in monitor mode) to make it easily accessible to non-technical users.
SnoopDog operates in three phases. Assuming the trusted set of sensors is on the
user (e.g., a wearable device or smartphone), SnoopDog is first in a passive monitoring
(background) phase, searching for suspicious causal patterns between the wireless traffic and
the user’s normal activity. If a device is flagged as potentially monitoring the user, an active
phase is engaged, and the user is instructed to perform a series of specific actions to detect the
sensor with high fidelity. Finally, if the sensor is unable to be spotted through a preliminary
search, a localization phase engages for accurate ascertainment of clandestine placement.
The user can either skip the background or the active phase per their convenience.
We evaluate SnoopDog over a representative set of wireless sensors following a taxonomy
of popular sensing devices that may be used for surveillance. The framework had a detection
rate of 96.6% and a device classification rate of 100% when the injected multi-modal event
was human motion. We show that the location of the bug can be narrowed down to a
sufficiently reduced region that facilitates the user’s search for the device. This feature is a
vast improvement over state-of-the-art approaches that localize devices as either indoors or
outdoors. While SnoopDog cannot detect any wireless sensor monitoring the user (chapter
8), it can detect a broad set of commonly used wireless sensors. We further formalize the
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challenges and limitations across different modalities.
Contributions: Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose SnoopDog , a generalized framework to detect arbitrary hidden clandes-
tine sensors by leveraging the cause-effect relationship between a trusted set of sensor
values observing an injected event and traffic patterns.
• We present a novel technique that leverages the notion of directional sensor coverage
to provide state-of-the-art localization for clandestine devices.
• We show how SnoopDog can be extended to identify the model of a device based on
packet inspection and publicly available information of device manufacturers.
• We evaluate SnoopDog with a mobile phone and a packet sniffer on a representative
set of clandestine sensors and show a detection rate of 96.6% and a device classification
rate of 100% when the injected multi-modal event is human motion.
4
CHAPTER 2
Background and System Model
The general approach to detecting wireless sensors relies on the notion that the device’s
wireless communication leaks information in some domain. This aspect has been exploited
for the development of wireless bug1 detectors which can sense the presence of wireless
transmitters in a space [32, 42]. Bug detectors are RF receivers that look for signals in
a frequency range with a received power above a certain threshold. The received power
threshold and frequency range can be set according to a target set of wireless devices. For
instance, to detect sensors that communicate over , a device would scan frequency ranges
around 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz. Similarly, the range can be set accordingly for other wireless
technologies like Bluetooth [27] and Z-wave [6]. In tuning the received power threshold,
there is a direct trade-off between detection accuracy and false positives [32]. If the threshold
is too low, one may falsely attribute wireless signals from other devices in the space, like
mobile phones, to bugs. On the other hand, a high threshold risks ignoring wireless bugs
that are not within close proximity of the detector. As these detectors provide no semantic
information about the detected signals, it is difficult to assume whether or not the observed
signal is truly originating from a hidden bug [42].
As wireless sensors transmit their information via packets, another technique to detect
them uses packet sniffing. Approaches like DewiCam [4] sniff wireless packets and use their
characteristics to train a classifier to identify whether or not a particular device is a camera.
However, even if the type of device is determined, it may or may not be monitoring the user.
If there is a camera monitoring the door of a house, it does not pose the same threat to a
1A bug in this context refers to a hidden device spying on the user.
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user’s privacy as a camera that is monitoring the bedroom. Hence, even if we are able to
detect what type of device is present in the space, it is difficult to characterize if its intention
is adversarial. A direct way to identify whether a device poses a potential privacy threat is
to determine whether or not it is actively monitoring the user.
Detecting sensors monitoring a physical space. If a wireless sensor is monitoring
someone in a physical space, the data that it captures is a function of the person’s interaction
with the space. For example, if someone moves into a space monitored by a motion detector,
the sensor’s control mechanism may be triggered and begin uploading relevant information
to the cloud to be processed and forwarded (e.g., an alert to the device owner or downstream
actuation). Similarly, the information recorded by a video camera captures variation as a
result of motion within the scene that it is capturing. If another sensor can observe and
measure the interaction of the user with their surroundings, we can identify whether the
user’s actions indicate a causal relationship with the wireless traffic of the sensor. If such
a relationship is found, then the sensor must be monitoring the user. To generalize our
approach, we provide a system and an adversary model.
2.1 System Model
We consider a system model for SnoopDog where a user has access to a laptop or smart-
phone device with a network card that can enter monitor mode to sniff wireless packets over
the same channel as one or more clandestine sensors. The system should further be equipped
with a trusted set of ground truth sensors to establish causality between the sensor values and
the associated patterns from the clandestine wireless sensor(s)2. These capabilities require
a set of certain assumptions.
sniffing assumptions. We assume that the sniffer on the user’s device can monitor the
encrypted traffic streaming from the clandestine device. SnoopDog does not require any
2We assume there may be additional, non-clandestine sensors that are monitoring the user. Such super-
fluous information is still informative, as the goal of this work is to detect all wireless sensors monitoring a
user.
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form of granted access to a particular network, i.e., SnoopDog should be able to sniff the
device regardless of whether or not the network is closed or hidden. Unlike previous solutions,
this implies that the user does not need to know the SSID or password of the network.
Causality assumptions. We assume that the user has a sufficient set of trusted ground
truth sensors whose modalities are sensing any of the user’s activities that would exhibit a
causality with the encoding patterns of any clandestine wireless sensors. We formalize the
notion of sufficient causality in chapter 4.
2.2 Adversary Model
The adversary’s goal is to remotely spy on a third-party occupant of a private space in real-
time. We assume the adversary uses an arbitrary set of wireless, commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) sensors that are tailored for clandestine placement. The communication between the
attacker and sensor may be encrypted and placed on an arbitrary wireless frequency band.
We further assume the adversary has deployed these clandestine sensors in a manner that is
not apparently visible to the user within the space. We focus on an attacker utilizing devices
that communicate over , as this is the most prevalent method of wireless communication for
remote monitoring using commercial and consumer equipment3.
3Although SnoopDog focuses on -connected devices, we discuss in chapter 8 how such a system could
be generalized to other wireless communication standards and protocols.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of SnoopDog framework. The SnoopDog framework first identifies
if a user is being monitored based on the cause-effect relationship between the values of a
trusted sensor, e.g., an IMU, and traffic patterns. It then inspects the associated packets and
identifies the possible devices based on the physical (MAC) address. Finally, SnoopDog
localizes each device relative to the user based on the received signal strength indicator
(RSSI) values.
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CHAPTER 3
SnoopDog Overview
The goal of SnoopDog is to identify and localize clandestine wireless sensors within an arbi-
trary space. As depicted in Figure 2.1, SnoopDog can detect and localize a wireless sensor
given it has access to a trusted sensor that can measure and quantify the ground truth in
the modality that we are trying to detect. SnoopDog works in three phases. When a user
first enters a new space, SnoopDog operates in a background mode to determine whether a
user is being monitored based on the cause-effect relationship between the values of a trusted
sensor (e.g., an on-body IMU) and traffic patterns. If the user wants to clear a room im-
mediately, the background phase may be optionally skipped; alternatively, the background
phase offers a low-overhead solution to bug detection. If a clandestine sensor is discovered,
SnoopDog enters its second phase and asks the user to perform a unique perturbation in
the space to further ascertain the presence of a snooping sensor. The associated packets
are then inspected to identify the possible device type based on the physical (MAC) ad-
dress. Finally, in the third phase, SnoopDog utilizes a trial-based localization technique to
identify the specific placement of the monitoring device. With the appropriate selection of
ground truth sensor, that is, a device which can semantically capture at least a subset of the
events captured by the snooping device, SnoopDog can detect clandestine wireless sensors
of arbitrary modality.
The objectives for a solution which can detect hidden devices in space should have the
following characteristics:
• The solution must work for arbitrary sensing modality.
• The user must be able to generate events in the space that will establish causality
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between a sufficient set of ground truth sensors and any clandestine sensors.
• The solution must work equally well in indoor and outdoor conditions.
• The solution must be reasonably compact enough for a user to easily transport from
room to room.
• The solution must work for all configurations.
• The solution should not be affected by encryption.
Given these challenges, we present our design for clandestine wireless sensor detection,
identification, and localization.
10
CHAPTER 4
Detecting and Identifying Snooping Wireless Sensors
This chapter outlines the ability of SnoopDog to detect whether a clandestine sensor is
actively snooping on a user. We describe the search space for wireless sensors, how to estab-
lish causality, how to generalize across modalities, and how to understand various sensors’
wireless transmission.
4.1 Searching for Wireless Sensors
The adversary can create a network and connect the snooping device to it. As a result,
the hidden device can be present in any of the possible channels. Even though SnoopDog
does not need access to these networks, it still needs to scan all frequencies and look for any
devices transmitting on them. 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz are the most popular bands for networks,
and as such, we focus on those particular bands, even though the SnoopDog scan region
can be easily extended to include other ranges. During discovery, the Network Interface Card
(NIC) scans through all channels sequentially to find available access points (APs) [13, 46].
Similarly, SnoopDog also scans through all the channels in monitor mode, but instead of
looking for available APs, it looks for transmissions in those channels and creates a list of
devices using the MAC address present in packet headers. As a result, SnoopDog does
not need to be connected to any specific AP to operate. Even if a network is hidden, its
transmissions can still be observed by monitoring the channel. Thus SnoopDog can detect
devices on any network. Because devices may transmit data intermittently, SnoopDog
continuously scans all channels and actively maintains an aggregate set of traffic data. Once
the list of devices has been populated, SnoopDog then seeks to detect causality between
11
user activity and data being transmitted from each device.
4.2 Detecting Causality with User Activity
Detecting the cause-effect relationship between the action of a user in a space and the data
captured by a clandestine, wireless sensor requires access to two essential components: 1) a
ground truth sensor to capture information about the user in the space and 2) a represen-
tation of the data collected by the clandestine sensor. While data packets transmitted by
wireless sensors may be encrypted, the header information is not. This header information
provides us with the MAC address and payload size of each transmitted packet. This data
can be grouped and aggregated for all the packets within a time window and provide infor-
mation as to how much data was transmitted by each device within that period. Given a
ground truth sensor, one can then identify causality between the ground truth sensor values
and the patterns in the volume of data transmitted by each device in the space. In contrast
to machine learning techniques, a causality approach allows SnoopDog to find the cause-
effect relationship of arbitrary modality across any device that is transmitting causal data.
One such method to find this cause-effect relationship is Granger Causality.
Granger Causality. A popular method to study causal relationships between two series is
Granger Causality [9]. According to Granger Causality, if a series X Granger-causes series
Y , then past values of X should contain information that helps predict Y above and beyond
the information contained in past values of Y alone. Formally, if we have a series Y as:
yt = a0 + a1 ∗ yt−1 + a2 ∗ yt−2 + .... + an ∗ yt−n, (4.1)
and we augment this series with the series X as follows:
yt = a0 + a1 ∗ yt−1 + .... + an ∗ yt−n + b1 ∗ xt−1 + .... + bm ∗ xt−m, (4.2)
then X Granger-causes Y if and only if Equation 4.2 gives a better prediction of yt than
Equation 4.1. Here, yt−k are called lags of y and xt−k are called lags of x where k ∈ [1, n].
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4.3 Characterizing a Representative Set of Snooping Sensors
In order to choose a set of ground truth sensors that can capture causality across any
modality, we focus on generalizing across a representative set, including cameras, RF, and
arbitrary sensors that report inferred (as opposed to raw) events.
Visual sensors. Wireless cameras are typically encoded with a codec that recognizes un-
derlying patterns in the frames of the video and utilizes this information for compression.
One such codec is H.264 [44]. An encoder first encodes the video using the standard, and a
decoder then reconstructs the original video with minor information loss.
Standard temporal compression algorithms compress the video with 3 key frame-types,
denoted I, P, and B frames–as shown in Figure 4.1. I frames (Intra-coded picture) hold
complete image information, whereas P and B frames contain fractional image information,
i.e., scene differences. As I frames are a complete image, they do not require any other
frames to be decoded. P frames (Predicted picture) only contain changes in the image from
previous frames. The information in a P frame is combined with the information of the
I frame preceding it to obtain the resulting image. B (Bi-directionally predicted pictures)
frames can construct the image from either direction. They can be coded with changes from
the I or P frames before them, changes from I and P frames after them, or interpolation
between the I/P frames before and after them. B frames are most compressible, followed by
P frames, and finally, I frames.
Hence, with increasing motion in the scene recorded by an IP camera, there will be an
increase in the data that must be transmitted due to the increase in the number of P and
B frames sent. Camera traffic will increase as the number of pixels being perturbed in the
scene increases; similarly, traffic will decrease if the scene transitions to a stationary one. As
such, if a human subject were to perform some motion in the scene, stop for enough time
to let the camera video settle down, and then move again, it will result in a unique camera
traffic pattern that corresponds to the user’s motion. This cause-effect relationship between
human motion and camera traffic can then be used to discover if a wireless IP camera is
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Figure 4.1: I-P-B Frames [41]
present in an occupied space. If there is no relationship between the camera traffic and user
motion, then the camera is not monitoring the user.
RF sensors. Low cost, off-the-shelf millimeter-wave (mmWave) RF sensors are available
that record the scene in the form of point-clouds. Recent works [34, 50] have shown that
these point clouds can be used to infer human activity. However, unlike a camera, a radar
device is a point scatterer, thus at any given time, only certain points in the scene reflect
back. Hence, with motion in the scene, the number of points captured in every frame by the
sensor (radar) vary considerably. In an empty scene, the number of points captured by these
sensors is fairly constant but varies as subjects move about the space. The sensor also collects
the velocity and intensity of the power received. This data helps the sensor in inferring fine-
grained information about the space. If such a sensor live-streams point-cloud data over ,
the payload size will vary over time with changes in the number of points captured in the
scene by the sensor. Hence, the network traffic will fluctuate with the number of points that
are being captured in the frame. As such, there exists a cause-effect relationship between
the subject’s motion and the device’s traffic.
Acoustic sensors. Another common type of bug used to snoop on people is microphones.
With the growth in personal home assistant devices such as the Google Home or Amazon
Alexa [18], it is trivial for someone to buy and install such listening devices in their homes.
Although they are typically triggered by a keyphrase such as “Okay Google” or “Alexa”,
there are “Drop In” features that facilitate remote snooping. An adversary can also change
the wake word of these devices to enable recording conversations of interest. Due to their
compact form factor, they can be easily hidden. In such cases, this device will also work
like an event-based clandestine sensor. Hence, services like SnoopDog that monitor traffic
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for change in network patterns and either correlate them with another sensor recording of
the same modality or find a cause-effect relationship with the ground-truth can detect their
presence using network sniffing [17,45]. Here, instead of the IMU, we use the microphone on
the user’s smartphone as the trusted ground-truth sensor. In chapter 8-Q6, we discuss why
it is challenging to detect and localize acoustic sensors that are continuously streaming.
Wireless sensors that encode inferred events. Motion sensors do not transmit a
continuous stream of information. Most off-the-shelf motion sensors are passive infrared
(PIR) based. They measure the infrared (IR) light from objects in their field of view. Any
change in this incoming IR light is inferred as motion. Instead of continuously transmitting,
they occasionally send data to their cloud service for processing once triggered by motion.
Additionally, a camera can be programmed to continuously record video but only upload
when a certain event occurs in the scene. These cameras behave like motion sensors and
hence can be treated similarly. Virtual assistants also wait for trigger words to transmit a
request to the associated cloud service, e.g., a user stating the device name to activate it [18].
Figure 6.7 shows the wireless traffic captured from an ordinary off-the-shelf motion sensor.
Motion events in the scene trigger network activity. These events are a result of a subject
moving in front of the device. Thus if a user moves around the room, stops, and moves again,
there will be a unique cause-effect relationship between user motion and device traffic.
4.4 Device Identification via MAC Address
A MAC address is a universally unique ID assigned to the Network Interface Controller
(NIC) for every networked device. It consists of 48 bits which are typically represented as
12 hexadecimal characters, i.e., xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx. The first 24 bits are the OUI (Orga-
nizationally Unique Identifier), which can uniquely identify a manufacturer or a vendor.
The MAC address of the sender and the receiver are contained within each exchanged
packet. More importantly, this information is not encrypted. As a result, SnoopDog
can easily obtain the MAC address to look up the device vendor. While we acknowledge
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that the MAC address can be spoofed, this technique can still prove useful in the many
cases where the adversary is a non-expert and thus has not spoofed the MAC. SnoopDog
contains a database with names and MAC addresses of known vendors that manufacture
surveillance devices. As SnoopDog detects more sensors, we add them to the available
database1. Traffic fingerprinting techniques [2,5,8,25,26,30,51] can also be used to overcome
the shortcomings of MAC-based identification.
1The link has been hidden in order to make the paper anonymous.
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CHAPTER 5
Snooping Sensor Localization
Algorithm 1 details the trial-based localization used by SnoopDog to infer sensor loca-
tion. In the case of multiple active sensors, this process can be repeated for each device.
Setup. Localization requires two input parameters: a region-of-interest to search over, and
the snooping sensor’s MAC address. To define the region-of-interest, we leverage Dead Reck-
oning [3, 21] for indoor user localization. For instance, a dead reckoning mobile application
on a user’s phone can instruct the user to walk the perimeter and capture the region bound-
ary. Aside from identifying granger causality in traffic patterns, the MAC address is also
used to ensure an appropriate trial method for localization (e.g., via techniques discussed in
chapter 4.4 and [14]).
5.1 Identifying Sensor Coverage
Although the malicious sensor is known to monitor somewhere within the region-of-interest,
it is unlikely to cover the entire region. Lines (1)-(8) narrow down the full search space
into a bounding box BBox of the sensor’s field-of-view. To begin, a user is instructed to
traverse the region (line 2). At regular time intervals, the user’s location is captured, and the
snooping sensor’s traffic is monitored for causality. Using the Granger Causality technique
described in chapter 4, a particular location is identified as either within or outside sensor
coverage. This process continues until the bounding box is determined to have sufficient
density for performing trial-based localization, depending on the coverage area size.
The remainder of Algorithm 1 (lines 9-18) reduces the BBox scope of sensor coverage via
directional elimination. Repeated trials are performed to specifically target high-probability
17
Algorithm 1: Localize identifies the location of a particular snooping sensor in a
defined region-of-interest
Input: The sensor’s MAC address
The region of interest
Output: The sensor’s location within the region
1 BBox← ∅
2 traversing ← BeginTraversingRegion(region)
3 while traversing do
4 userloc← DeadReckoningLocation()
5 inV iew ← GrangerCausality(MAC)
6 if inView then
7 BBox← BBox ∪ {userloc}
8 traversing ← SparseBBox(BBox)
9 Loop
10 MLE ←MostLikelySensorLocation(region,BBox)
11 if SufficientBBox(region, BBox) then
12 return (BBox,MLE)
13 trialRegion = GenerateTrial(MLE,BBox)
14 inV iew = PerformTrial(trialRegion)
15 if inView then
16 BBox← trialRegion
17 else
18 BBox← BBox \ trialRegion
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origins in order to either identify or eliminate likely sensor locations. Each round begins by
solving for the most likely origin MLE for the sensor (line 10). While this process could
be performed randomly, utilizing physical information about the current bounding box can
significantly reduce the number of necessary trial rounds. For example, if the bounding box
shape can be reasonably fitted to a triangle, then the sensor is likely horizontal-facing and
placed on a wall. On the other hand, an ellipsoid coverage area likely indicates a sensor
placed on the ceiling or floor.
An iterative process then proceeds to reduce the area of possible sensor locations to a
pre-defined threshold (e.g., 10% of the region), upon which the bounding box and MLE
are returned (line 11). In each iteration, a directional trial is conducted. GenerateTrial
identifies a suitable position and heading for the trial by selecting a point near the center of
the bounding box and facing the MPE (line 12). In our evaluation, we found distances of
approximately 3 meters to be the maximum applicable distance for a trial. The trial takes
one of many forms; for an inertial sensor, a user faces the designated direction and waves an
object (e.g., hand or shoe) closely in front of their chest while shielding this activity with
their body from any sensor present behind them. To trigger a camera sensor, a laptop plays
a video clip that randomly flashes the screen with different colors. For audio, a trigger sound
is played, and so on. If the trial results increased the device traffic, the bounding box is
reduced to areas within visible range (line 16); otherwise, those areas are removed (line 18),
and the next iteration begins.
5.2 Ensuring Sufficiently Reduced Region
In order to provide a guarantee that this localization method will always result in a minimal
bounding box that is sufficiently small (e.g., 10% of the search region), a key assumption
must be made: for any arbitrary bounding box, a trial can be identified which will eliminate
a proper subset of the bounding box. In the case of Algorithm 1, this assumption can be
reformed such that one can always construct a trial that eliminates at least a single point
contained within the bounding box set. Due to the directional nature of each trial, this
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can be achieved simply by conducting a trial that is positioned directly between two points
within the bounding box, and facing directly towards one of the two points such that the
other is obstructed. In the case of two points with large intermediate distances, a two-phase
trial must be performed facing towards (and away from) each point, respectively.
Given the assumption that every trial can eliminate at least a single point from the
bounding box set, guaranteeing that Algorithm 1 will always reduce the region to a certain
size is trivial. In the worst case, for a bounding box of n points, n-1 trials must be per-
formed. In practice, each trial can eliminate many points contained within the bounding
box. Furthermore, by leveraging the most likely sensor location, one can reduce the search
space significantly and with relatively few trials.
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CHAPTER 6
Implementation
This chapter presents an overview of our SnoopDog framework implementation by instru-
menting readily available tools that are likely to be in a user’s possession. We rely upon the
following commonplace hardware and software.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Packet Sniffing: A laptop (Lenovo Thinkpad) is used to run the Wireshark network sniffing
utility. The laptop’s network card enters monitor mode and begins capturing all transmitted
packets in the frequency band to aggregate traffic statistics for analysis. As it is not necessary
to connect to a specific wireless network to monitor traffic, SnoopDog can capture and
identify clandestine wireless sensors across all traffic, even if they reside on a closed or hidden
network. A smartphone can also be used instead of a laptop, but requires a rooted [39] phone.
Collecting User’s Motion Data: User’s motion data is collected via the IMU present
on the smartphone (Google Pixel 3). The smartphone is placed either in the user’s hand
or inside the user’s pocket. 50 Hz accelerometer data is collected and used to study the
cause-effect relationship between motion and sensor traffic. We collect along each of the 3
axes and use them separately as if motion is present in only one direction, the other 2 axes
contribute minimally to the analysis, and may instead serve as noise. The smartphone is also
used to collect audio and localize the user in his/her surroundings, which aids in localization.
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6.2 Overview
SnoopDog sniffs the wireless traffic and aggregates the statistics over time, while user
motion is captured using the IMU. This data is used to detect hidden sensors monitoring
the user by measuring the cause-effect relationship between user motion and device traffic.
SnoopDog also captures device MAC addresses to infer the manufacturer via an available
database we have created. After detection, the trial-based algorithm is used to localize these
sensors.
6.3 Aggregation of Traffic Statistics
Each device’s traffic is grouped by MAC address, windowed, and processed to compute device
traffic volume and variation. SnoopDog monitors packet sequence number in the WLAN
layer to isolate and remove duplicate or redundant packets. As large images are sent over
multiple fixed-length packets, a sufficiently large window size must be used. We chose a 100
ms window to group all packets with the same image within one interval. Cameras require a
frame rate higher than 10 Hz to satisfy the flicker fusion (i.e., persistence of vision) threshold
of the human eye [10,23].
For camera encodings, we discard I-frames, as they do not encode differences in a scene
and require higher bandwidth, thereby adversely affecting the causality analysis. To discover
these frames, we first identify the camera frame rate by converting the time domain traffic to
the frequency domain using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The frame rate is the peak of
the FFT, as shown in Figure 6.1. We then change the aggregation window size to correspond
to this frame rate, calculate the data rate of the camera, as shown in Figure 6.3, and smooth
variations with sliding window aggregates.
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Figure 6.1: Detecting frame rate of the camera. In this case, the frame rate of the camera is
25 Hz which is where the peak is.
6.4 Detecting the Cause-Effect Relationship between User Motion
and Hidden Devices
While sniffing the network, SnoopDog classifies the networked devices present into two
categories: devices that transmit data continuously, and devices that have periodic or event-
based transmission.
6.4.1 Wireless Sensors that Encode Raw Data
Some representative sensors that continuously transmit variably encoded raw data include
camera and RF sensors.
Camera: When a camera is monitoring a static scene, the traffic is fairly constant, as shown
in Figure 6.2. As the scene is perturbed by human motion, the wireless traffic changes rapidly.
However, it is yet unclear whether human motion causes this variation. As soon as the user
enters a new space, he or she can turn on , which works in the background to correlate IMU
data with traffic of the transmitting devices. As users walk in a space, the starting and
stopping patterns of their motion are unique. This unique pattern creates a fingerprint for
the camera traffic. Once SnoopDog is able to determine a cause-effect relationship between
device traffic and user’s motion, it alerts the user. To definitively ascertain the presence of a
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camera, SnoopDog enters phase two, where the user is asked to perform a stop-start-stop-
start-stop (S5) motion as follows: 1) the user stays stationary for some time to allow the
device traffic to stabilize. 2) The user performs jumping jacks at the current position. 3)
The user stops again and waits for the camera traffic to settle. 4) The user performs jumping
jacks again. 5) The user stops. This motions causes a pattern to appear in the traffic as
shown in figure 6.3.
The entire detection phase requires 35 − 45 seconds. While the user is performing the
above S5 motion, SnoopDog sniffs the packets on the network and records the user’s IMU
acceleration. Figure 6.3 plots the camera traffic after I-frame suppression and user accelerom-
eter data while performing the S5 motion. We observe that camera traffic is a function of
human motion. When the human is static, the traffic is small, but when the human be-
gins performing jumping jacks, the traffic rate increases. To prove that the accelerometer
series indeed has an effect on the camera traffic, we leverage Granger Causality using the
statsmodel package in Python. The null hypothesis of the Granger Causality Test is that
the IMU series does not granger-causes the camera traffic series. Hence, if the p-value of our
test is below a certain threshold of 0.08, we can reject the null hypothesis and claim that
the IMU series granger-causes the camera traffic series.
RF sensor: the detection process remains the same for RF as that of a camera. We use
an off-the-shelf mmWave RF sensor from Texas Instruments, as shown in [34]. We model
the information obtained from the sensor as traffic. The modeled traffic from the RF sensor
due to human motion is shown in Figure 6.4. Unlike a camera, RF sensors respond to either
motion or other sources of RF in the space.
As soon as motion occurs within the space, the traffic changes rapidly in response. This
is because the points captured by the RF sensor vary with motion. If the traffic of some
device which was static when there was no motion but changes rapidly when there is motion
and goes back to being static when motion stops, it is a clear indicator that the device is
monitoring user movement. To detect such devices, SnoopDog first monitors the traffic
when the scene is static. It then asks the user to perform the S5 motion in the space while
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Figure 6.2: traffic captured from a camera over a static scene and a scene where a human is
walking around.
SnoopDog monitors the traffic. As soon as the user is finished, the user should leave the
space so that SnoopDog can monitor the traffic again and conclude the presence or absence
of an RF sensor.
6.4.2 Wireless Sensors that Encode Inferred Events
Sensors that encode inferred events may transmit information periodically or upon event
detection. By simply examining network traffic, it is difficult to ascertain if the device is
transmitting periodic data, like a temperature sensor, or transmitting inferred events like a
motion sensor.
Motion Sensor: Typical off-the-shelf motion sensors have a timeout to prevent continuous
alerts. After the sensor detects a motion event, it stops inferring motion events for some
time. If a human walks into the room, the motion sensor sends that information to a cloud
server, which in turn sends an alert to the snooping user’s smartphone or performs an action
like turning on lights. After sending an alert, the sensor waits for the timeout period before
it looks for more events. Most motion sensors have a timeout period between 30 seconds
and 3 minutes. Similarly, there can be other sensors in the scene that have a timeout period
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Figure 6.3: traffic of a camera and its comparison with IMU data of the user who was being
monitored in the scene.
between uploading events. To discover a device’s timeout period, SnoopDog correlates
user movements with device traffic. If SnoopDog detects two events in the traffic series
of a device and the user was in motion during the time between the two events, this time
is noted as the timeout period. SnoopDog uses its active phase to further improve the
timeout estimation by asking the user to move around the space until two events are detected
in the device’s network traffic. If the user wants even higher confidence in the detection,
SnoopDog asks the user to move around the space, leave the space for the timeout period,
and then move around the space again. After that, the user moves out from the space and
then waits for the timeout period to end. If SnoopDog detects traffic by the device around
the same time the user moved and none when the user is not moving, we can conclude
that the traffic of the device is caused by user movement. This process can be repeated
to increase the confidence of detection. A room can also be equipped with a camera that
transmits motion events in the form of alerts. Such a camera can similarly be detected.
In Figure 6.7, we move around the room (denoted by red dotted lines) and notice that the
traffic from the motion sensor responds to these motion events.
Audio snooping: SnoopDog records user conversations in the background and correlates
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Figure 6.4: Modeled traffic for an RF sensor in a static scene and one where a user performs
our detection trial.
it with the traffic of the devices on the network. If the occurrence of a certain phrase or a
word cause the traffic of a device to change, SnoopDog asks the user to repeat those phrases
until it can establish a cause-effect relationship between the occurrence of that phrase and
the traffic of the device. Once SnoopDog knows the “wake word” for the acoustic home-
assistant device, it repeats the recording several times while monitoring the device traffic to
increase the confidence level of detection.
In our implementation, we used an Amazon Echo whose wake word was “Alexa”. In
Figure 6.7, we say the phrase “Alexa, what’s the time right now?” four times and plot the
device traffic. It is clear that these distinct peaks are a direct response to the trigger phrase.
In 20 trials with different phrases, SnoopDog was able to detect causality 100% of the time.
6.4.3 Device ID via MAC Address Lookup
SnoopDog checks its database for a match of OUI in the device’s MAC address. If present,
SnoopDog can inform the user with higher confidence that the device is indeed a surveil-
lance device. Otherwise, it is added to the database and identified as a clandestine sensor.
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Figure 6.6:
Figure 6.7: (a) traffic of a motion sensor. The red-dotted line signifies a motion event. (b)
traffic of an Alexa device for the user repeating the same phrase 4 times.
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6.5 Device Localization
SnoopDog uses dead reckoning and asks the user to walk around the perimeter of the room
to obtain a rough map of the room. Next, the user is asked to perform a detection trial at
various locations within the room. More trials lead to better localization. At every location,
SnoopDog tries to establish a cause-effect relationship with the device traffic. Regions with
no cause-effect relationship are eliminated. This process is repeated to further reduce the
search space for each clandestine device.
IP Camera: The traffic generated by a camera monitoring a scene will increase when the
scene is dynamic. To exploit this, we first monitor the traffic of the device identified as a
camera for 30 seconds over a static scene. Each trial consists of standing in a particular
location (e.g., the middle of the scene), pointing a laptop in a particular direction, and
playing a video that rapidly changes the colors on the screen of the laptop for 30 seconds.
This process is then repeated in different directions. If the camera is able to monitor the
laptop screen, its data rate during that period will be higher. On the other hand, if the
laptop screen is not visible, the camera’s traffic rate will be similar to the static scene. We
can eliminate a fraction of the space where no activity is detected and repeat the process
for the remaining region. In this way, we narrow down the possible region where a camera
is located. We give a step by step walk-through of this process in chapter 7.
RF sensor: RF sensor localization is similar to that of a camera. However, since RF sensors
cannot detect the flickering screen of the laptop, we use human movement. SnoopDog asks
the user to stand in the middle of the space and wave their arm up and down rapidly in
front of them while shielding this motion from the other side of the space with their back.
If the RF device traffic does not respond to these stimuli when performed on one side but
responds to it on the other side, we can eliminate that space.
Motion Sensor: Motion sensors are triggered by motion in front of them. SnoopDog first
identifies the motion detector timeout (refer chapter 6.4.2), and then asks the user to stand
in the middle of the room before the timeout expires. After timeout expiry, they are asked
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to move their hand in front of them while shielding it from the other side with their body.
Acoustic (Audio) sensors: SnoopDog records the wake word of the device and asks the
user to move around the room while this sound is repeatedly played from the smartphone
app. If the user walks around the room but does not find any place where there the traffic of
the device changes, we increase the volume and repeat the experiment. On the other hand,
if the sound played at every point in the room causes the traffic of the device to vary, we
decrease the volume and repeat the experiment. Finally, we identify areas where the sound
causes network response and areas where it does not. We continue to reduce the volume of
the device until the search space has been sufficiently reduced1.
1A walk-through of this process is provided in chapter A of the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 7
Evaluation
For evaluating SnoopDog , we used 4 cameras, 1 motion sensor, 1 Amazon Echo and 1 RF
sensor. We selected off-the-shelf IP cameras at different price points to evaluate if we can
achieve similar performance despite device heterogeneity.
7.1 Wireless sensors that encode raw data
Wireless IP Cameras. For Granger causality analysis, we lag the first series by one
element at a time and observe what value of the lag results in the lowest p-value. Cameras
have a delay between when the scene changes and when the data is visible to the adversary.
We found that this delay can vary between a few milliseconds to up to 4 seconds. If the
adversary is using a tape delay in transmission, we can perform this analysis over a longer
delay period. In this time, the camera captures the video, encodes it, and sends it to its
cloud server, which then forwards it to the receiving display. Assuming symmetrical delay,
SnoopDog sniffs the packets during the first half of the transmission; we choose a lag value
of 2 seconds.
The p-value threshold below which SnoopDog claims a successful detection is set at 0.08.
We selected this using the results obtained from the first camera. However, we evaluate our
detection with all the other cameras and show that this p-value threshold is optimal for all
the cameras.
We evaluated our detection for 4 cameras – Foscam ($49.99), Kamtron ($39.99), Victure
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Camera Trials Successful Accuracy
Foscam 15 15 100%
Wansview 30 29 96.6%
Kamtron 25 21 84%
Victure 26 26 100%
Total 96 91 94.7%
Table 7.1: Evaluation results for camera detection
($35.99), and Wansview ($29.99). We performed 80 trials on 2 different users1 to evaluate
the detection accuracy. The results of our experiments are presented in table 7.1. To improve
the detection accuracy and confidence of detection, a user can perform the detection trial
several times and take a majority vote. The detection works well even when a portion of the
human body is occluded by objects such as a table.
RF sensors. We use a TI mmWave IWR1443BOOST to evaluate the performance of
SnoopDog for detecting RF sensors. We first monitored the traffic with no motion in the
space and then asked the subject to move in and perform the detection trial. If the traffic
of a device rapidly changes during movement but becomes stable if there is no activity,
we conclude there is a cause-effect relationship between user motion and the device. In 20
experiments, SnoopDog was able to detect RF sensor presence every time.
7.2 Wireless sensors encoding inferred events
For sensors that encode inferred events, it is not possible to perform pure time-series Granger
causality analysis to ascertain if there is a cause-effect relationship present between the sensor
because their network traffic is discrete. Instead, we perform an activity and track network
response. To detect the presence of an event-based sensor, we ask the user to move around
1The data is collected from the authors and hence does not require IRB approval.
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the room, wait for the timeout period, and move around again. SnoopDog scans all device
traffic within a period of 5 seconds after the motion to determine which device responds
to user motion. If the device has traffic activity after the user moved, then the device is
inferring events from the user motion. We evaluated this with an off-the-shelf motion sensor
from Kangaroo Security. We performed 15 trials, and SnoopDog was able to detect this
device every time.
7.3 Localization
We evaluated SnoopDog for 4 different spaces with different sensor placements. The accu-
racy of localization in all of these cases depends on the user’s requirements. The user can
perform more trials to reduce the probable region where the sensor is placed. We use an
example to demonstrate how the SnoopDog localization algorithm works. To perform our
localization, we chose a room as shown in Figure 7.1. The camera is placed at a corner of
the room. We begin by performing our S5 detection trials in different parts of the room.
The location and results of our trials are shown. Based on these observations, we know that
the camera is present somewhere in the square region of the room and hence, we eliminate
the other part and start our trial-based localization.
- Causality not found
- Causality found
3.04 m
3.04 m
1.3 m
2 m
Figure 7.1: Lab dimensions and results of the detection trials.
We stand in the middle of the probable space and hold a laptop such that the screen is
pointing in one direction. Then we turn to the other side and repeat the same experiment.
We observe that there is a significant (>150%) increase in the camera data rate when the
laptop is pointed towards the left side. When pointed to the right, the data rate remains
33
Figure 7.2: A walk-through of the trial-based localization algorithm in the laboratory envi-
ronment in Figure 7.1. The arrows represent the direction the laptop screen was facing.
similar to that of an empty room. Thus we eliminate the right portion of the room from the
probable area. We again stand in the middle of the leftover space and repeat the experiments
until we achieve a sufficiently reduced space.
Audio-based localization: A similar elimination-based localization for audio sensors is
described in Appendix A.
7.4 Overhead Analysis
Time: Sensor detection can happen in the background with minimal user intervention.
However, this will take some time. In situations where a user wants to immediately know
if he/she is being spied on by a sensor (such as when entering into a changing room), they
can skip the first phase and directly begin the second phase where they will perform the S5
motion. It takes about 40 seconds to perform active detection. For localization, each trial
can take 30 seconds. Since the localization space reduction is determined by the user, he/she
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can perform the trial any number of times. If the total number of trials is n, the overhead
will be about 30n seconds.
User effort: If the detection occurs in the background, there is no overhead in terms of user
involvement. However, both active and localization phases require user effort. In case the
user is suffering from physical disabilities, he/she may find it hard to follow through these
steps.
7.5 Effects of range on detection
The range of a device plays an important role in its detection. The camera range is the
depth which it can record meaningful information from the scene. If the user stands too far
from the camera, the S5 trial may not produce enough variation in the camera traffic for the
cause-effect relationship. For motion sensors and RF sensors, the range is specified by the
vendor. The motion sensor that we used has a range of 15 feet (4.6 m) and the RF sensor we
used had a range of 4 m. For Amazon Echo, the range is a function of the loudness of sound.
For the camera, we perform our detection trials at different distances to find out what the
range of detection is.
We perform the S5 motion in front of a camera at 1 m and gradually increase the distance.
We find that as we move away from the camera, the changes in its traffic decrease. For the
Wansview camera, the distance at which traffic changes are not enough to establish causality
is the smallest at about 3 m.
7.6 False negatives for background detection
Figure 7.3 shows camera traffic and IMU data for a user walking randomly in a room. As
long as the user stops at some point within the detection period, SnoopDog is able to detect
hidden devices. However, if the user is continuously stationary or continuously in motion,
SnoopDog fails to detect the presence of clandestine sensors.
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Figure 7.3: traffic of a camera and its comparison with IMU data of a user walking randomly
with stops
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CHAPTER 8
Discussion
Q1: What is the usability of ? We envision SnoopDog to be implemented as an app
on either a smartphone or a smartwatch (or a combination of the two). This means an end-
user will not need any prior knowledge about causality and coverage of a device to use it.
SnoopDog will continuously work in the background to look for a cause-effect relationship
between a user’s actions and device traffic. It will then guide a user step-by-step through the
entire localization procedure. Since an adversary can place a sensor at any time (e.g.,when a
user checks in a room, searches for devices, finds none and then leaves for dinner after which
the adversary places the spying device.), SnoopDog will still find it because it continuously
works in the background. This will not cause any overhead in terms of user involvement.
Q2: Can SnoopDog detect any wireless sensor? Although SnoopDog can detect a
wide variety of sensors, it cannot detect any wireless monitoring sensor. For a sensor to be
detectable by , the traffic must be encoded with a Variable Bit Rate (VBR) algorithm and
the data recorded by the sensor must change in response to user perturbation which can be
recorded by a ground truth sensor. That said, most surveillance devices such as cameras,
motion sensors and smart-home assistants today fall into this category, and thus we believe
SnoopDog can serve as a valid defense.
Q3: How can false positives be reduced? For false positive to occur during active
detection, the device’s traffic needs to map directly to the S5 motion during the active
phase and user’s motion during the background phase, which is unlikely. If there happens
to be another camera in an adjacent space monitoring another user who is performing the
detection trial within the same time window as the first user, it will trigger a false detection.
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However, this probability is extremely low. We were unable to identify false positives over
our network evaluation. Nevertheless, it remains a possibility, and mitigating such instances
are highly desirable.
Simple strategies can significantly reduce the chances of false positives. First, during the
initial monitoring phase for wireless devices, any periodic trends in traffic patterns can be
noted; the detector trial should ensure its periods are not synchronous with such periodicity.
Furthermore, the detection process can be done multiple times with varying and erratic
period lengths. This will drastically decrease the chances of a false positive, as a device
would have to coincidentally follow this effectively random traffic pattern. Finally, the entire
process itself can be performed repeatedly; each iteration compounds the decrease in false
positive rate, such that it eventually reduces to a statistical impossibility.
Q4: How can devices fool ? If the adversary suspects that the subject is using , they
can either modify the encoding schemes, turn off the device, use data padding, add random
noise, or vary the resolution of the data being transmitted. We detail these approaches in
Appendix B. However, if the traffic of THE device changes drastically when the detection
trial is performed, this in itself is a form of causation and SnoopDog can detect it.
Q5: Are there alternative approaches to causality?One alternative approach to
detecting snooping sensors is correlation. Correlation measures the size and direction of the
relationship between two variables. If the values of two variables change at the same time
and in the same direction, they are highly correlated. However, correlation does not imply
causation. If we have a sensor that measures the ground truth in the modality we want
to detect, we need to use causality analysis. For example, it takes the camera some time
to process the information and send it over to the server. So if we capture human motion
with an IMU, the camera traffic will lag the IMU time series. This is correctly captured by
causality analysis but not by correlation. However, if instead of using a sensor to measure
the ground truth, we use another sensor that can capture the same modality that we are
trying to detect, we can use correlation because if both the devices are capturing the same
event, their traffic should show similar trends.
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Future work can also explore the efficacy of data-driven approaches such as deep learning
for time series classification.
Q6: Can SnoopDog work for other wireless communication standards like
Bluetooth, Zigbee, and Z-Wave? Although SnoopDog targets -connected devices, we
can generalize the same framework for other popular wireless communication standards. This
framework can be extended to standards like Zigbee [19], Z-Wave [49], and Bluetooth [11,27]
as long as we have the following: 1) A receiver that can scan their probable frequencies and
sniff their packets to find if any devices are transmitting and 2) the ability to find unique
device IDs from packet headers and distinguishing header information from payload size.
Q7: What happens when there are multiple people present? When there are
multiple people present in the space, we need to ask everyone to leave during detection and
localization. In cases where other users are non-cooperative, their motion will affect the
network traffic of these devices and cause false alarms or false negatives.
Q8: Can we detect continuously streaming audio bugs? There are two ways to
encode audio, either constant bit rate (CBR) or variable bit rate (VBR). VBR techniques
make use of similarity in sound, such as prolonged silence, to reduce the amount of data
required for encoding. In contrast, CBR always encodes with the same number of bits.
Many off-the-shelf audio recorders and audio streaming apps use CBR. Since SnoopDog
only has access to the payload size of a packet, there must be variation in the payload to
determine causality. Hence, SnoopDog cannot detect CBR audio bugs.
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CHAPTER 9
Related Work
This chapter presents the most relevant and related works.
Detecting hidden devices using RF signals. A popular tool to detect hidden devices is
called a bug detector [29], which is an RF receiver that can sense if the received power in a
particular frequency range is above a threshold. The problem with such devices is that they
are not reliable, and can produce false alarms when used near other sources of RF signals
such as mobile phones or laptops [32, 42]. Also, they give no additional information about
the type of device and where it is located. After detection, the onus lies completely on the
user to physically find the device and verify if it is a hidden surveillance device or not. The
host may have a wireless device to monitor the power consumption of his property, but to
the bug detector, it would seem similar to an IP camera.
Classifying devices on the network using wireless traffic sniffing. While services like
Princeton IoT Inspector [14] collect traffic statistics to identify the types of devices present
on the network, they fail to identify if those devices are indeed spying on the user or not.
Just ascertaining the presence of a surveillance device is not enough. The device may be
present outside the house or it may be monitoring some part of the house which was already
disclosed by the home owner. In cases like this, just identifying such a device exists is not
enough, we also need to determine two important facets – is the device spying on the user and
is it located in an area of the house that has the potential to violate user privacy. Moreover,
tools like this need to have access to the network in order to be effective. If the snooping
devices are placed in a hidden network or on a password protected network, the use cases of
such a tool are limited.
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Other network traffic analysis tools [1, 33] utilize traffic data to find which devices are
consuming high bandwidth. Such techniques can be used to classify audio and video data
streams present in the wireless networks. However, with an increase in streaming services
[20, 38], it is difficult to distinguish camera video and audio flows with those of streaming
services based on just their bandwidth usage.
Detecting cameras on the network using wireless traffic sniffing. In [43], Wampler
et. al. shows that information leakage occurs in camera traffic due to how videos are
encoded. They observe that changing lighting conditions cause noticeable variations in the
network traffic. Several works [23,28] leverage this observation to detect cameras monitoring
an environment. Though these techniques perform well, their performance degrades when
the environment lighting changes naturally. Additionally, while this technique works well
for a camera, it does not generalize to other types of snooping devices, like RF sensors or
motion detectors. Finally, in order to be able to change the lighting conditions of a space,
the user requires either specialized hardware (like an LED board or a bulb) or access to
lighting controls, which is not guaranteed.
Data driven approaches like DewiCam [4] extract features from the intrinsic camera traffic
patterns to train a classifier which can detect cameras. They exploit the correlation between
human motion and camera data flows to determine if the camera is indoors or outdoors.
However, it is unclear if such an approach will hold true over diverse set of cameras with
varying processing speeds and data flows.
In [47], Wu et. al. present another technique to detect hidden streaming cameras through
simultaneous observation. The authors use their own camera to record a scene while simulta-
neously sniffing the network traffic. They compare the data rate and pattern of their trusted
camera with other devices in the network to look for any similarities. If a similarity exists,
there is a high probability that the device is a camera.
Localizing wireless devices using RSSI. Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) is
the estimate of the power received at the receiver from the transmitter. As the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver increases, the power received drops, and so does
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the RSSI. This property is leveraged to localize devices using RSSI [22,24,40,48]. However,
due to phenomenon like multipath and shadowing, the accuracy of RSSI based localization
varies from space to space [16]. As a result, the error is very high (in order of several meters).
For small rooms, such a result will be meaningless, as the snooping device can be effectively
hidden anywhere.
9.1 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented SnoopDog , a framework to detect, identify, and localize any
wireless sensor monitoring a person in an arbitrary space. SnoopDog works by establishing
causality between a set of ground truth sensors monitoring a user and the transmitted
information of wireless devices on a WiFi network. It then uses this causality to perform
trial-based localization. We implement SnoopDog on a set of commonly available devices
such as a smartphone and a laptop and evaluate our solution on a set of representative
clandestine sensors. The framework had a detection rate of 96.6% and a device classification
rate of 100% when the injected multi-modal event was human motion or sound.
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APPENDIX A
Audio-based Localization for Personal Home Assistants
In this chapter, we describe the audio localization technique step-by-step. First, we find
the optimal volume at which when the sound (a phrase containing the wake word of the
device) is placed on some points causes the device traffic to change. Then we go around the
room while SnoopDog repeats that sound continuously and checks them for causality with
device traffic as shown in Figure A.1. Sound played at the points marked as green produces
cause-effect relationship with the device traffic. We eliminate the region where we detect no
causality. Next, we reduce the volume by 1 level and repeat our experiment in the left-over
space till we are left with a region of desirable size.
- Causality not found
- Causality found
3.04 m
3
.0
4
 m
1
.3
 m
2 m
Figure A.1: Trial-based localization for acoustic sensors.
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APPENDIX B
Techniques to fool SnoopDog
B.1 No Encoding or Data Padding
SnoopDog uses the relationship between encoding schemes and ground truth to find out
if there is a device which is monitoring the user. Hence, to fool SnoopDog , the sensors
can either send un-encoded raw data or they can pad the encoded data to make the data
rate constant. Cameras can either pad their traffic or they can send un-encoded images
frames. Since sending images will put a large overhead on the network bandwidth, padding
the traffic [2] is a better idea. We pad the camera traffic wind random payload in Figure B.1.
Since SnoopDog cannot see what’s inside the payload, it can be anything. The device can
even send labels in the payload that help the server decide if this is a valid packet or fake
data generated to fool detection. Also in Figure B.1, we pad the traffic of a motion sensor to
make it appear like a constantly transmitting device with no variation in traffic in response
to user’s motion.
For RF sensors, one can find out the maximum number of points it can output and then
always pad the information so that we are transmitting the maximum number of points
allowed. These extra points could all be zeros which would make it easier to filter them out
on the server side.
Since motion sensors only send information if certain events occur, they can pad their
traffic when no event occurs. As a result, they will have constant traffic for which causality
analysis is not possible.
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Figure B.1: Padding the motion sensor and the camera traffic
B.2 Adding Random Noise to the Data
Another way to fool SnoopDog is by injecting noise into the device’s wireless traffic at
random intervals for some time window. Since SnoopDog utilizes the change in device
traffic to ascertain a cause-effect relationship, the variations caused by injecting random
noise are able to fool the detection.
Devices that do not transmit continuously can randomly send information that creates
a pattern similar to their inferred event traffic. This way they can keep sending their in-
formation which is hidden within random traffic. We add random noise which appears like
regular traffic for a motion sensor in Figure B.2. This noise can be anything, and hence the
server can differentiate it from actual motion events.
B.3 Constantly Vary the Resolution of the Data Being Transmit-
ted
For devices like camera, there are several video resolutions that an adversary can choose.
The higher the resolution, the better the video quality is. However, if an adversary chooses
a scheme where the video resolution is constantly varying, it will cause random changes in
the network traffic. Hence, even if the user’s motion is causing changes to the traffic, it is
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Figure B.2: Injecting noise in the traffic of a motion sensor to fool SnoopDog
overpowered by the changes in network traffic due to a variation in resolution.
For RF sensors, they can vary the number of maximum points that they transmit con-
tinuously to achieve a similar effect.
B.4 Adding a tape/broadcast delay to the transmissions
An adversary can add a tape delay to the sensor transmissions, i.e. intentionally adding a
delay between when something was recorded and when it was transmitted. Since, we are
only looking for causality within a small time window, a high tape delay will be able to fool
SnoopDog . However, given enough storage capacity and time, it is possible for SnoopDog
to scan the entire recording to look for cause-effect relationship with user motion. But for
large tape delays, this is not practical.
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